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Roger H. Gordon and James Levinsohn 
Observed patterns of  tariffs  across  countries,  and  of  trade  policies  more 
generally, are very puzzling given the clear policy implications of traditional 
optimal tariff models. These models suggest that countries with little market 
power should not attempt to distort trade patterns, while those countries that 
do have market  power  should attempt to  restrict  imports  and/or exports, 
relative to the amount that would otherwise occur, in order to take advantage 
of  this  monopoly/monopsony  power.  Yet  rich  countries,  which  might 
plausibly  have  important  market  power,  are  often  observed  subsidizing 
exports in various ways. To the degree to which they restrict trade at all, it is 
often in sectors such as agriculture, where the country clearly has no market 
power, or it is done through nontariff barriers, where the profits arising from 
the difference between domestic and  world prices  are received by  foreign 
firms. Poorer countries often impose tariffs,  even in  situations where they 
have no plausible market power. 
The objective of  this paper is to explore to what degree this pattern  of 
border distortions may simply result from each country's  attempt to offset 
the trade distortions created by  their domestic tax  structure and  by  other 
domestic policies.'  The basic intuition is as follows. Most countries collect a 
sizable fraction of their tax revenue through taxation of domestic production, 
using a variety  of  tax  instruments, including output taxes, property taxes, 
and capital income taxes.2 The corporate income tax, used heavily in most 
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developed  countries,  is  a good  example. As a result  of  these  taxes, more 
domestic  taxes  are paid  on domestically  produced  goods  than  on  foreign- 
produced goods. 
If the tax rate were the same in all sectors, then the only effect would be a 
readjustment  in  the  exchange  rate.  However,  effective  tax  rates  vary 
substantially across industries and tend to be much higher on manufacturing 
firms, presumably owing to lower administrative costs in  enforcing a tax on 
larger-scale  firms.  If  a country  is  a net  exporter of  manufacturing  goods, 
then taxes on domestic production raise the relative prices of these goods. If 
the country has market power in these goods, it can thereby take advantage 
of this market power without the need to enact an explicit export tax. If the 
country  has  no  market  power,  however,  then  it  can  offset  the  distortion 
created by domestic production taxes through a rebate of  the production tax 
when  goods  are  exported,  as occurs  under  a  VAT,  or through  an  explicit 
export subsidy. 
If  a country  is  a net  importer of  manufacturing  goods,  then  production 
taxes discourage the development of a domestic manufacturing industry. To 
offset this distortion, a country can impose a tariff  at a comparable rate on 
manufacturing  imports. In fact, GATT rules allow a country to use import 
tariffs  or  export  subsidies  in  this  way  to  offset  taxes  on  the  output  of 
domestic firms, as long as the effective tax rate on imports is no higher than 
that  faced  on domestic production.  GATT rules do not allow taxes  on the 
income  of  domestic  firms  to  be  offset  in  the  same way,  h~wever.~  One 
alternative  response  is  to  impose  nontariff  barriers  to  imports.  While 
nontariff barriers do not collect any revenue, unlike explicit tariffs, they still 
serve to protect domestic production from foreign goods that are artificially 
cheaper owing to the distorting effects of  the domestic tax structure. 
Poorer countries tend to be net importers of manufacturing  goods and so 
should be observed imposing tariffs on these imports. Richer countries tend 
to  export  manufacturing  goods,  explaining  the  pressure  toward  export 
subsidies. 
Taxes are  not  the  only  policy  distorting  relative  domestic  prices.  Many 
countries  intervene  actively  in agricultural  markets, for example;  it is also 
common  for  countries  to  set  up  state-run  enterprises  producing  tradable 
goods  whose  output  is  unlikely  to  be  sold  at  marginal  cost.  The  same 
arguments made above with respect to tax distortions apply with equal force 
to other distortions. 
Nothing in this argument shows that the above policies are optimal for a 
country. Bhagwati (1971) argued that the first-best response was to eliminate 
any  domestic  distortions;  only  if  this  failed  should  tariffs  be  used  as  a 
second-best  response.  Rather  than  taking  domestic  tax  distortions  as 
exogenous,  however,  as did Bhagwati  (1971),  we  will explore the charac- 
teristics  of a country’s optimal use of domestic taxes, tariffs,  and nontariff 
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an import tariff (or export subsidy) at the same rate has identical economic 
effects to a tax on domestic consumption of that good, using, for example, a 
retail  sales  tax  or  a  VAT,  explaining  which  of  these  equivalent  tax 
instruments is used leads us to focus on their relative administrative costs. If 
administrative  costs  become  important,  however,  then  they  can  have 
important effects on the characteristics of  optimal policy and on the size of 
any resulting trade distortions. We  explore the likely pattern of these trade 
distortions. 
This explanation  for the observed use of tariffs has been discussed in a 
variety of papers since Bhagwati (1971). Corden (1974) explicitly noted that 
tariffs might well form part of an optimal tax system, once collection costs 
are  taken  into  account,  though  he  did  not  attempt  to  model  the  optimal 
domestic and  trade  tax  structures formally.  Riezman and  Slemrod  (1987) 
provided empirical support for this intuition by showing that tariffs are used 
most  heavily  by  countries  that  likely  face  high  administrative  costs  of 
alternative  taxes.  However,  little  attempt  has  been  made  to  examine 
explicitly what optimal tax theory would in fact imply about the optimal use 
of  tariffs.  One exception  is  Aizenman  (1987),  who examines a particular 
example  with  one  consumer  in  which  the  only  available  taxes  are  a 
consumption tax and a tariff. In his example, only the consumption tax has 
administrative  costs,  which  are proportional  to consumption  tax  revenues. 
He finds that tariffs would be part of  an optimal tax ~ystem.~  Diamond and 
Mirrlees  (1971)  showed  that  tariffs  should  not  be  used  by  a  small  open 
economy  if  it  sets  the  excise tax  rates  on all  goods optimally.  However, 
Boadway,  Maital, and Prachowny  (1973) and Dixit  (1985), among others, 
have pointed out that tariffs would almost certainly be used if they were the 
only source of tax revenue and might well be used if the available set of  tax 
instruments is more limited than assumed in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 
They do not examine the characteristics of  an optimal tariff when some but 
not the full range of domestic taxes are used.5 
A variety of other explanations have been proposed for the observed use of 
tariffs  and  export subsidies.  In many  political  economy  models  of  rent- 
seeking behavior, tariffs or quantitative restrictions result from the lobbying 
behavior of  economic agents who then compete for the revenue or license 
premia  associated  with  the  protection.6  This  work  is  summarized  in 
Bhagwati (1982). A very different class of models has found that increasing 
returns to scale may give rise to welfare-enhancing trade taxes or subsidies. 
In these models, nicely surveyed by Helpman (1984), a firm produces with 
increasing  returns  to  scale.  If  the  returns  to  scale  are  external  to  the 
individual firm, firm output may be suboptimal, and trade policy can address 
this externality. If, on the other hand, the returns to scale are realized by the 
firm itself, the resulting market structure tends toward one of large firms with 
market power. This, in turn, leads to another body of research. The results 
here  often  yield  welfare-enhancing  trade  taxes  or  subsidies.  This  is  the 360  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
strategic trade policy literature. Here, trade taxes levied by a government act 
as a credible precommitment  and alter the ensuing  game  played  by  firms. 
This literature is well surveyed in Grossman and Richardson (1985). 
The objective  of  this  paper  is  not  to  question  the  plausibility  of  these 
alternative explanations.  Instead, our objective  is to reexamine  the  pattern 
and characteristics of net trade  distortions, taking into account both  border 
taxes  and  the  trade  distortions  created  by  internal  taxes,  to  see to  what 
degree the empirical regularities motivating these other papers still seem to 
exist once the effects of  domestic taxes are taken into account. 
The outline  of  our paper  is  as  follows.  In  section  10.1, we  develop  a 
theoretical model of optimal tax and tariff policies in the presence of admin- 
istrative costs. Numerical simulations of this model will be used to provide a 
clearer sense of the economic implications of the model. This model will then 
be  used to forecast the  pattern of  trade distortions  across countries  and  to 
examine the implications of  international agreements banning tariffs. 
In section 10.2, we examine IMF data on government  financial statistics 
from  a  variety  of  countries  in  recent  years,  to  see  to  what  degree  the 
forecasts of  our model  are consistent  with  the data. In particular,  we will 
attempt to compare average tariff  rates and  average production  tax rates to 
see to what degree the resulting trade distortions are offsetting. 
10.1  Theoretical Analysis of Optimal Taxes and Tariffs 
In examining the characteristics of the optimal tax  and tariff  policy  in a 
small open economy, let us  start with the  standard optimal tax  framework 
used  by  Diamond  and  Mirrlees  (1971)  and  assume  that  all  outputs  are 
tradable but that inputs are not. They showed that, as long as the government 
has use of excise taxes on all goods, then under the tax policy that minimizes 
efficiency costs production will occur on the production possibilities frontier. 
International trading opportunities  are in effect another production technol- 
ogy, extending the production possibilities fr~ntier.~ 
As a result, under optimal policies, the value of domestic output, based on 
world prices, would be maximized conditional on the supplies of all factors. 
A marginal increase in the output in one industry at the expense of output in 
any  other  industry,  holding  aggregate  factor  supplies  constant,  would  not 
affect the value of domestic output in the world market. We will refer to this 
situation as one in which there are no trade distortions.  Note, however, that 
the optimal taxes will still change trade patterns by changing the pattern of 
domestic consumption and factor supplies. 
We  rederive the Diamond-Mirrlees result to provide a formal comparison 
with  other  results  that  we  examine  below.  In  particular,  assume  that  a 
country produces two goods using two factors and constant returns to scale 
technologies.  Assume that the government can collect revenue using excise 
taxes on the value of goods produced or on the value of factors supplied and 
using tariffs on imports.' 361  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
We  start by  defining notation. Consumption of good  i by  household h is 
denoted by  chi, the supply of  factorj by  the household is denoted by  Khj, 
while  its  endowment of  this  factor is Gj.  The utility  of  household h  is 
denoted by  uh(ch,, ch2, G, -  K;2  - Kh2).  Utility functions can 
differ among the H  households. Let the price that consumers pay for good i 
be denoted by qi, while the amount they are paid per unit of factor j supplied 
is rj. Each consumer's demand for the two goods, and  supply of  the two 
factors, depends only on these two output prices and two factor prices. By 
substituting these demand and factor supply functions into the direct utility 
function, we obtain the indirect utility function of  household h, denoted by 
Vh(q1, q2,  rl,  r2).  In order to fix the domestic price level, we assume that the 
numeraire is the price of good 2, so that q2 = 1. 
If KO  denotes the amount of the jth factor used in the domestic production 
of  the ith good, then domestic output of  that good, denoted Xi, satisfies Xi 
= fi(Kil,  Ki2), where the production function has constant returns to scale. 
Let pi denote the price that domestic firms receive for output of good i, and 
let sj be the amount that they pay per unit for input j. These prices can differ 
from the prices that individuals face because of excise taxes on production. 
If  ci(sI, s2) denotes the unit cost function in  industry i, then competition 
implies that 
(1)  pi  = ci(sl,  s*). 
Government  revenue,  denoted  R, is  used  to  buy  the  two  goods  on 
international markets to maximize some measure of  the welfare of  govern- 
ment expenditures. We  assume that the country is  a price taker on these 
international markets. Let government purchases of good i be denoted by Gi. 
Since international prices are taken as given, we can denote the resulting 
welfare derived from government expenditures by  W(R). 
If  Mi denotes imports of good i, then materials balance implies that 
By  assumption, no trade takes place in factor markets,'  so that 
(3) 
Let the price, in units of the second good, that must be paid for good i in the 
international  markets  be  denoted  by  pi'.  These  prices  can  differ  from 
domestic consumer prices because of tariffs. Trade balance then requires that 
i 
The government's tax and tariff rates are implicit in the above prices. In 
particular, if  we denote the tariff on good  i by  ti, then qi  = p,*(  1  +ti).'' 362  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
Similarly, if the tax rate on the value of production of good i is denoted by T~ and 
the tax on supply of factor j is yj, then qi = pi(  1 + T~)  and rj = sj( 1 -  yj). 
In order to have a well-defined set of  optimal taxes, we must restrict the 
set of possible taxes further. Note, for example, that tax revenue from tariffs 
equals Zi tipL*Mi.  But, given equation (4), the revenue would be exactly the 
same if the tariff rates were instead ti -  a for any value of  a. We  therefore 
assume that there is a nonzero tariff only on good 1. Similarly, revenue from 
the remaining taxes  equals Zi[~piXi  +  Xj  yjsjKij].  But  competition and 
constant returns to  scale imply  that  Ci  pixi  =  &Zj sjKV,  implying that 
lowering all the  and raising all the yj by  some constant b will have no 
effect on tax revenue or on incentives. Therefore, we can add or subtract a 
constant from all the other tax rates and again leave revenue unchanged. We 
normalize by  assuming that T~  = 0, implying that p2 = 1. 
The government is then assumed to choose the tax and tariff rates t,, T~, 
y,,  and y2, given international prices pf,  so as to maximize some measure of 
social  welfare  that  we  denote  by  Zh  Vh+  W(R).  It  does  so  subject  to 
equations (  1  t(4). 
In order to understand the solution to this problem, we start by  solving an 
easier problem and then show that the two problems have the same solution. 
In particular, assume that the government can control directly the consumer 
prices, ql, rl, and r2, and all production and international trade decisions, 
subject to the restriction that consumer markets clear at the chosen prices. 
With these powers, the government can do at least as well as in the previous 
case since it can duplicate any solution to the previous problem. However, 
we  will also show that it can do no better. 
To  begin  with,  the  government  fully  determines  consumer  behavior 
through  its  choice of  the prices ql, rl, and  r,. In  making production and 
trade  decisions,  given  its  choices on  consumer prices,  its  sole  objective 
would be to  maximize R  since the consumer prices completely determine 
each of  the  vh. But, by  equations (2)  and (4), R=CipfGi=C,pf(Xi-Ci), 
where  Ci, = Xh Chi. Since  consumer  prices  determine  Ci, production 
decisions will be made  so as to maximize ZipfXi subject to equation (3). 
Resources  will  therefore  be  allocated  to  maximize  the  value  of  output, 
based on international prices, given factor supplies. Production is therefore 
efficient. 
Note that the resulting optimal allocations are just  those  that  would  be 
produced  by  a competitive market  facing p,  =p; and  facing those  sj  that 
clear the factor markets, given the factor supplies implied by  the consumer 
prices.  The  desired consumer  prices  can  then  be  produced  by  setting  1, 
based on the  difference between the desired q1 and p; and  setting the  yj 
based  on  the  differences between  the  desired  rj and  sj.  This  solution is 
therefore a feasible outcome of  the first  optimization problem.  Since it is 
the optimal solution to a more general problem, it is the optimal solution to 
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We  therefore conclude that, if a country has use of  all excise taxes, then it 
would never choose to distort trade patterns. But, given the proposed tax and 
tariff system, p1  =p; only if  t, = 7,. Therefore, if excise taxes on output are 
based  on  production rather than  consumption,  then  the  optimal  tariff  on 
imports is at the same rate as is assessed on domestic production of  that 
good. This tax system is equivalent to various other tax systems, requiring 
care in comparing it to observed tax and tariff systems. For example, we can 
replace both the production tax on good 1 and the tariff on imports of  good 
1 with just a sales tax at the same rate on consumption of  good  1 without 
changing the resulting allocation. We  can also replace the tax on imports of 
good  1 with a tax at the appropriate rate on exports of good 2 (e.g., choose 
a different value of a). This is simply the Lerner symmetry result. Similarly, 
we  can  alter  the  consumer  taxes  so  that  all  consumer  prices  change 
proportionately (i.e. change b,) without changing the resulting allocation. 
Sales  can  be  taxed  either  directly  or  through  a  VAT.  In  addition,  a 
proportional income tax could be introduced, with appropriate modifications 
in the other tax rates, without changing the allocation. 
All these results describe the optimal allocation for a small country facing 
fixed  prices on  the  international market.  In  order  to  describe the  choice 
problem faced by a large country, we could replace equation (4) in the above 
derivation  with  a  more  complicated  function  describing  the  trading 
opportunities  faced  by  a  large  country  and  redefine  the  function,  W(R), 
determining the welfare produced by government revenue. Standard types of 
results concerning the optimal trade distortion would come out of the model. 
This trade distortion would  show up  as a difference between  the optimal 
tariff and the production tax rates. 
What happens, in this model, if  an international agreement were signed 
forbidding tariffs? Since a tariff  along with an equal rate tax on domestic 
production is equivalent to a sales tax on domestic consumption of that good, 
a country could simply eliminate the tariff, reduce the tax rate on domestic 
production  by  the  initial  tariff  rate,  and  increase  the  tax  on  domestic 
consumption  by  the  initial  tariff  rate,  leaving  the  allocation  entirely 
unchanged. In fact, when the Common Market was  set up,  there was  an 
attempt to shift domestic tax systems away from taxes such as a turnover tax 
that create trade distortions and toward a destination-based VAT,  which does 
not  distort  trade  patterns."  These  modifications  to  domestic  taxes  on 
production and consumption would be very hard to prevent by international 
agreement, given most countries'  reluctance to accept restrictions on their 
choice of a domestic tax structure. But, if the adjustments do occur, then the 
international agreements forbidding tariffs accomplish nothing. 
Why then does so much attention and effort get devoted to these treaties 
forbidding tariffs? One possible explanation is that the adjustments in the 
domestic tax system that are necessary to replace tariffs are not so easy and 
so may not in fact happen. The equivalent domestic taxes may, for example, 364  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
be much  more expensive to administer. But, if  we introduce administrative 
costs, the optimal tax argument given above must be changed to take these 
costs  into  account.  If  these  administrative  costs  are  important  enough  to 
prevent countries from entirely replacing tariffs with  suitable modifications 
to their domestic  tax  systems,  then  these  costs  should be  large enough  to 
have important effects on the characteristics of an optimal tax/tariff system. 
Various  approaches  could  be  taken  to  model  administrative  costs. 
Aizenman (1987), for example, assumed that the administrative costs from a 
particular tax were proportional  to the revenue raised  by  that tax, with  the 
proportionality  factors differing by tax.  This approach does not strike us as 
entirely satisfactory, however, since the bureaucracy  necessary to run a tax 
system and monitor tax returns should be approximately the same regardless 
of the tax rate. l2 We therefore explore an alternative approach in which there 
is  some  fixed  cost to using  a  given  tax  base,  regardless  of  the  tax  rate 
chosen, with the size of the fixed cost varying by tax base. 
How  does  the  previous  analysis  change  if  we  introduce  fixed costs for 
each  tax  base?  To  begin  with,  when  there  are  alternative  taxes  that  are 
exactly equivalent,  then a country would  consider using only that one with 
the cheapest fixed cost. If, in spite of the fixed costs, the country uses  the 
same set of taxes as analyzed above or their equivalents,  then the first-order 
conditions characterizing the optimal tax structure remain the same, as does 
the conclusion that there will be no trade distortions. 
If the fixed costs are high enough to force a country to restrict its set of tax 
instruments further,  however,  then results can change. To  take  an extreme 
case, if the fixed costs are too high on all taxes except a tariff on good 1 but 
government  revenue  is valuable enough to make  it worth paying  the fixed 
cost to use this tariff,  then trade distortions  certainly  exist. In intermediate 
cases, when  some but  not  all of  the  other taxes  analyzed  above are used, 
trade distortions may still be desired. As Diamond and Mirrlees (197 1) point 
out, production  efficiency  may  not be  optimal  if  the  government  does not 
have use of  a full set of excise taxes. 
Consider, for example, the special case in which, because of fixed costs, a 
country taxes production of good 1 and taxes imports and exports but does not 
tax factor incomes. This may provide a crude description of the tax system in 
a number of  poorer countries,  if we interpret good  1 to be industrial goods. 
Industrial production, imports, and exports are quite easy to tax since there are 
normally few industrial firms and few ports of entry. In contrast, agricultural 
output and retail sales are much more difficult to tax, given the large number 
of small firms involved. For mathematical convenience, in the formal analysis 
of this case we examine the equivalent system of a sales tax on good 1,  denoted 
by cr, and a tax on domestic production of good 1, denoted by 7,  ignoring any 
implications for administrative costs. 
In this setting, will a country choose to distort trade patterns by taxing or 
subsidizing  domestic  production?  If  not,  then  the  optimal  production  tax 365  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
should be zero. To judge this, let us examine a country’s optimal tax rates. 
Under  our  assumptions,  the  country  will  choose  these  rates  so  as  to 
maximize. 
subject  to  equations (lt(4).  If  we  let  the  marginal  utility  of  income to 
household h be denoted by  ah, let ci equal the unweighted average value of 
the ah, and let eq represent the uncompensated own price elasticity of  C,, 
then the resulting first-order conditions can be expressed as follows:  l3 
-  H cov(a h’ ””)  c1  = 0, 
and 
In each of  these equations, the first term on the left-hand side measures the 
gain  from  shifting  extra  revenue  from  a  representative  individual,  with 
marginal utility of  income equal to ci,  to the government. The second term 
measures any resulting efficiency loss. This efficiency loss arises owing to 
changes in C1 and X, since in each case the marginal benefits differ from the 
marginal  costs  owing  to  taxes.I4  The  remaining  terms  measure  the 
distributional gains or losses resulting from the tax change. For example, if 
the “deserving”  individuals, who have a relatively high value of  ah, also 
have a relatively low value of  ch,, then the covariance in equation (6a) is 
negative, implying that a tax increase is more attractive since it is paid more 
heavily by those with low a’s. 
If the optimal tax policy does not distort trade, then at this optimum T  = 
0. If,  however,  the  left-hand side of  equation (6b) is necessarily  positive 
when evaluated at this point,  then we know that the optimal T  is positive, 
and conversely. In order to shed light on the sign of  the left-hand side of 
equation (6b), when evaluated at T  = 0, we need to know more about the 
derivative acllaT  =  &, achllaT. Increasing the tax on production affects 
consumption of good  1 because it affects factor prices, even though it does 
not change output prices. In order to simplify the story, let us assume that the 
utility  function  is  additively  separable  between  consumption  and  factor 
supplies, so that each individual’s demand curve for good 1 depends only on 
output prices and factor income, denoted by  Yh,  where factor income equals 366  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
xj rjKhj. In addition, let  Phl represent the  fraction of  extra factor income 
spent on good  1 by household h, and let P1  be the average value of  phi." 
Under these assumptions, 
Here, the first term on the right-hand side equals the average drop in C1  per 
dollar drop in income times the aggregate change in  income. The drop in 
income includes both the direct effect of  the tax change plus the effects of 
any  resulting  behavioral  response.  The  second  term  captures  any  effects 
arising from the income drop being concentrated in households where Phl is 
particularly large or small. 
If  we substitute the value of  (W’ - &) from equation (6a) into (6b) and 
make use of  equation (7), we  find  that  the value of  the left-hand side of 
equation (6b) equals 
In general, this expression can take on either sign, indicating that optimal 
trade  distortions  can  be  either  positive  or  negative.  However,  if  factor 
supplies are inelastic with respect to uncompensated changes in factor prices, 
and if the three covariances are small, then this expression is positive as long 
as eq > 6,.  If the utility function were Cobb-Douglas, then eq = 1, and PI 
is the  fraction of  total income spent on  good  1  and  so is  less than  one, 
implying that the optimal 7  is positive. In this special case, trade would be 
subsidized. 
The  intuition for  this  result  is  fairly  straightforward.  By  ignoring  the 
covariance terms,  distributional effects are ignored,  implying that  all that 
matters are revenue gains and  efficiency losses.  The efficiency loss from 
raising a dollar of extra revenue by any means, starting from a situation with 
only a sales tax on good 1, equals the resulting drop in consumption of good 
1 times the sales tax rate. When the sales tax is used to raise extra revenue, 
the price of  good 1 rises, and the resulting drop in consumption of  good 1 
depends on its own price elasticity, eq. In contrast, when a production tax is 
used, the average rate of return to factor supplies drops. If we ignore changes 
in factor supplies, then this drop in income leads to a drop in expenditures on 
all goods, where the drop in expenditures on good  1 is proportional to PI. 
If  the sum of the remaining terms is sufficiently negative, however, trade 
may end up being discouraged rather than encouraged. If, for example, the 367  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
change in  factor supplies under a production tax results in  a further fall in 
income, then consumption of good 1 will fall yet more, making a production 
tax  less  attractive. Estimating  the  direction of  change in  factor supplies 
owing  to  a  rise  in  7 is  complicated, however.  To  begin  with,  the  un- 
compensated price elasticity of  a factor can in general be either positive or 
negative. In addition, while a tax on production of good 1 must lower the 
return to the factor used relatively more in industry 1 versus industry 2, it 
must  raise the return to  the  other factor.16 All  we can say is that,  if  the 
uncompensated price elasticity of the factor used most heavily in industry 1 
is large enough and the uncompensated price elasticity of the other factor is 
not too high, then results could reverse. If  good  1  is industrial output and 
good 2 is agriculture, then an increase in T would presumably hurt capital 
owners and  skilled workers, while incomes of  farmers would  necessarily 
increase since the cost of other factor inputs has dropped while output prices 
remain unchanged. The supplies of  capital and skilled labor are likely to be 
quite elastic, more elastic than the supply of farmers, so this reversal could 
well happen. 
The third  term  in brackets may  also be  negative.  This would  occur if 
capital owners and skilled workers spend a larger fraction of  their incomes 
on industrial goods.  As  a result,  the drop in  income that  arises from an 
increase in 7 would  be  largest among those most  likely to buy  industrial 
goods, resulting in a larger fall in C,. 
The last two terms in equation (8) capture distributional implications of 
the tax change. If  the tax on production of  good  1 lowers the incomes of 
capital owners and skilled workers and raises the incomes of  farmers, this 
may  make the  tax  more  desirable because  of  its  distributional effects.  l7 
Because of these conflicting pressures, in general the optimal trade distortion 
could be of either sign. 
If other subsets of the initial set of tax instruments were used, the analysis 
is similar, but the conditions determining whether trade  is encouraged or 
discouraged are  at  least as complicated. Rather than  develop these cases 
explicitly, we  provide  some  numerical  examples  below  to  provide  some 
sense of the nature of the resulting optimal tax rates. Given the common use 
of nontariff trade distortions, however, we  thought it useful to discuss the 
characteristics of  the optimal policies when nontariff barriers to trade are 
used instead of tariffs or the equivalent tax barriers. The particular example 
we choose to focus on is one in which a country uses a tax on production of 
good 1 to raise revenue but in addition has the power to restrict imports of 
good  1. How will the resulting policy compare with one in  which explicit 
tariffs are used instead? 
One complication that must be addressed in this situation is who receives 
the rents that arise from imports that cost less on the international market 
than they sell for on the domestic market? If  the government were to sell 
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license  fees.  With  market  clearing  license  fees,  quotas  have  identical 
economic  effects  to  tariffs.I8  Similarly,  if  licenses  were  distributed  in 
proportion to supplies of either or both factors, then the results would again 
be  identical  to  those  found  with  explicit  tariffs-the  subsidy  to  factor 
supplies  created  by  the  distribution  rule  for  the  licenses  would,  under 
optimal policies, be offset by  a surtax that raises as much revenue as is lost 
through giving away the licenses. If  import licenses are distributed without 
charge, however, then results will differ. We  explore two  special cases. In 
the  first,  licenses are  distributed in  a  lump-sum fashion  among  domestic 
residents or perhaps as a function of  the exogenous Kj.  Alternatively, the 
import licenses could be  distributed among foreign firms as, for example, 
with a voluntary export restraint (VER). 
If the nontariff barriers to trade lead to a domestic price for good 1 equal 
to ql>p;,  rents derived from imports equal (ql  -p;)M,, which we denote by 
nl. Assume  that  the  rents  are  given  to  domestic residents  and  that  the 
fraction eh of these rents goes to household h. What will be the nature of the 
optimal policy? Rather than describing the resulting first-order conditions in 
detail, we simply point out some important aspects of the problem. 
Let us focus first on the policy in which the net distortion to trade is zero, 
so that p;=pI,  implying that  T=  (ql-py)/pl.  At  any given tax rate  T,  the 
outcome is the same as would occur with a sales tax on good 1 at a rate u1 
=  T, along  with  a  lump-sum  transfer  to  each  household  h  equal  to 
6h(ql-pF)M1>0. In  contrast,  an explicit  tariff  in  combination  with  a 
production tax at the same rate on good 1 is exactly equivalent to a sales tax, 
without any lump-sum transfers. Therefore, at each possible production tax 
rate,  aggregate  tax  revenues  are  lower  when  nontariff  rather  than  tariff 
barriers are used, creating pressure to raise tax rates to compensate for this 
loss in revenue. The marginal efficiency cost of  raising tax revenue, at any 
initial value of  T,  may not even be higher when nontariff rather than tariff 
barriers are present since aggregate lump-sum transfers could well decline as 
q1  rises if M,  drops by enough in response. Another complication that arises 
in  this situation is that distributional benefits (or costs) may result from the 
lump-sum transfers, making higher tax rates more (less) attractive. Optimal 
tax  rates can therefore be  either larger or  smaller when nontariff  barriers 
replace tariff barriers. 
The same complications arise as previously in determining the nature of 
the net  trade distortions.  In addition, however, if  we  were to increase T~, 
holding  q1 fixed,  lump-sum  transfers  now  increase  as  long  as  imports 
increase, whereas previously tariff revenue increased. As a result, protection 
is more valuable than before. 
If rents from the difference between foreign and domestic prices of good 1 
go to foreigners, the government may still wish to impose nontariff barriers. 
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expenditures to expand. As long as these extra government expenditures are 
valued highly enough, trade restrictions will appear attractive. l9 
This discussion of the effects of nontariff barriers can be  applied also to 
foreign exchange controls. Through administrative control of  the exchange 
rate, domestic prices can differ from world prices. If the resulting controls 
reduce international trade, then piIp;<ql/q2.  As a result, while Cj  p;Mj=0, 
under  foreign exchange controls Cj  qjMj>O.  With explicit tariffs,  Cj  qjMj 
simply  equals  tariff  revenue.  If  the  government  sells  access  to  foreign 
exchange  or  receives  all  the  rents  through  a  government  monopoly 
controlling all international trade, then again the results would be the same 
as with explicit tariffs. If access to foreign exchange is given away, however, 
then the analysis would be the same as with nontariff barriers. 
10.1.1  Numerical Example 
In order to shed further light on the nature of optimal policies, we decided 
to explore a simple numerical example.  Specifically, we assumed that both 
the production  functions and the utility  functions were  Cobb-Douglas. Let 
the  share of  revenue in industry  i  used  to purchase  inputs  of  factor  1 be 
denoted by  Ail; the rest of the revenue is used to purchase the second factor. 
Assume that there are two types of households.  The first type supplies only 
the  first factor,  and  the  second  type  supplies  only the  second factor.  The 
utility  function  of  the  hth  type  is  denoted  by  Uh=&  Phi In chi+  Ph3 In 
(Ki  Kh)+  Ph4 In R, where  C?=,Phi=  1. The  government  chooses  its 
policy  so as to maximize  Xi wiUi. In interpreting these results,  we assume 
that factor 1 is capital, factor 2 is labor, good 1 is industrial output, and good 
2  is agricultural  output.  Type  1  households  are therefore  capital  owners, 
while type 2 households are workers. We  assume that  A,,  = .7 and  A,,  = 
.3, so that industrial production is relatively  capital  intensive. In  addition, 
we  assume that  PI1 =  .65 and  PZ1 =  .5, so that  capital  owners spend 
relatively more of their income on industrial goods. The compensated own 
price elasticities  of  factor supplies are initially  set equal to .15, and factor 
endowments are each initially set equal to 1.0. Finally, we set pi = .9 and 
Ph4  =  .2. These parameters imply  that  good  1 will  be imported, except 
under extreme policies. 
Several idiosyncratic characteristics of this model should be pointed out. 
To begin with, uncompensated factor supply elasticities are zero, eliminating 
this consideration from the analysis. In addition, some care is needed when 
interpreting distributional effects. We  did not build in diminishing marginal 
utility  of  income.  As  a  result,  the  marginal  social  utility  of  income  to 
household  h  equals  simply  whVh/rh,  so that  a higher utility  level in itself 
implies a higher marginal utility of  income. In deciding what value of o  = 
w,/w2 is reasonable, keep in mind that we report the aggregate, not the per 
capita,  income and consumption levels of  each group.  To  the  degree that 
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there  are  fewer  capital  owners  than  workers,  then  the  relative  income  of 
individual  capital  versus  labor  owners  exceeds  their  relative  share  of 
aggregate income,  implying  that a utilitarian  objective  would  likely assign 
capital owners less weight.  In addition,  even if  each group faced the same 
factor price, the resulting utility  level of the capitalists would differ because 
of the differing weight they place on consumption of good 1. If the prices of 
the two consumption goods were the same, the capitalists would have higher 
reported  utility, given the characteristics of  a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
with  differing  combinations  of  weights on different goods. To  compensate 
for this, the social welfare weight on their utility would need to be lower. We 
therefore focus on utility functions with w 5 1. 
The resulting  optimal tax rates are reported in table  10.1. The first two 
rows in the table report the optimal tariff rate for two different values of the 
relative  weight,  w,  on the  utility  of  the  capitalists.  When  the  tariff  rate 
increases,  capitalists gain relative to workers because  output of the  capital 
intensive industry expands, bidding up the rental price of capital relative to 
the wage rate. However, a higher tariff rate also raises the consumer price of 
industrial goods, on which capitalists  spend a larger share of  their income. 
Given our parameters,  the first effect is more important, and the tariff rate 
rises as capitalists are given more weight in the welfare function. 
The next two rows describe the optimal tax rates when both a tariff and a 
tax on production of  good  1 are available. Notice first that the tax rates and 
the fraction of GDP used for public goods are much higher than when only a 
tariff  is  used-raising  revenue  is  far easier  with  a  somewhat  broader  tax 
Table 10.1  Optimal Tax and Tariff Rates 
Tariff  Production  Sales 
on  Tax on  Net  Tax on  Revenue/ 
Good 1  Good 1  Tariff  Good 2  GDP  VK  VL 
Tariff only: 
w  = .5  .lo5  ... 
w  =  1.0  .117  ... 
w  =  .5  ,333  .527 
w  = 1.0  .375  ,331 
0 = .5  ,246  .437 
w  = 1.0  ,252  .184 
w  =  .5  ...  ,127 
w  = 1.0  . . .  ,114 
w  = .5  ...  ,153 
w=1.0  ...  ,019 
Tariff and production tax: 
Tariff, production tax, sales tax: 
Production tax: 
Production tax, sales tax: 
105 
117 
-  ,127 
,033 
-  ,133 
.057 
-.I13 
-  .I02 
-  ,133 
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base.  (Seen from  a different perspective,  the  fixed  costs  associated with 
domestic taxes must  be  quite large before it  is  not  worth  incurring such 
costs.) As a result, utility levels are also higher, particularly for workers who 
consume relatively less of  the  first good.  The optimal tax  rates  are very 
sensitive to the distributional weight,  w, however. When  w  = .5, so that 
capitalists get less weight, trade is subsidized, implying that imports occur in 
spite of the fact that the world price of good 1 exceeds the domestic producer 
price  of  good  1. The  net  tariff  rate  can  be  measured  by  (pl-p;)/p;= 
(tl  --~~)/(l  +T,),  which in this case equals -  12.7 percent. When w  = 1.0, 
however, trade is slightly discouraged.*'  As in the previous case when only a 
tariff was used, trade distortions have conflicting distributional effects, but 
tariffs on net aid capitalists by  increasing demand for the capital intensive 
good.  When  w  =  1.0, aiding capitalists is  desired because the  marginal 
social utility  of  income to capitalists exceeds that  for workers,  given the 
algebraic properties of  the Cobb-Douglas utility functions being used. 
The following two rows describe the optimal tax rates when a tariff, a tax 
on domestic production of good 1, and a tax on domestic sales of  good 2 are 
used.*l  Again,  we  find  that  either  trade  taxes  or  subsidies are possible, 
depending on the  distributional weights used.  Note,  however,  that  social 
welfare, and the relative size of the government, increase only slightly when 
we  add a sales tax on good 2 to the available tax instruments, implying that 
only minor  fixed costs would lead  a country to use a simpler tax  system. 
Since workers buy relatively more of  good 2, their welfare falls when this 
extra tax is introduced, while the welfare of capitalists increases. 
In addition, we examined the effects of eliminating tariffs as a possible tax 
instrument, as might  occur under GATT  or IMF pressure.  If  this left the 
country with only a tax on domestic production of good 1,  social welfare and 
government expenditures would  drop substantially. In  spite of  the  loss of 
tariff revenue, the production tax rate falls dramatically, in order to keep the 
trade distortion from becoming too large. The loss is large enough to justify 
large administrative costs of adding further tax  instruments. If  the country 
were left with both a tax  on domestic production of  good  1 and a tax on 
domestic sales of good 2,  then there would be a major shift toward use of the 
sales tax-the  trade distortions created by the production tax are too large to 
make  its  use  attractive.  Given these  readjustments in  domestic tax  rates, 
eliminating tariffs does not necessarily reduce trade distortions, though trade 
subsidies become more likely than trade taxes. 
We  tried a variety of  sensitivity tests to see to what degree these results 
changed as various parameter values  were  changed.  Changing any  of  the 
parameters except for the distributional weights had only minor effects on 
the size of  the optimal trade distortions. 
In table  10.2, we  explore how nontariff barriers would be used  if  tariffs 
are not available and only domestic production of good 1 is taxable. For each 
value  of  w,  there  are  three  sets  of  results,  describing  how  the  optimal 372  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
Table 10.2  Optimal Production Tax and Nontariff Barriers 
Implicit  Production  Net 
Tariff  Tax  on  Implicit  Revenue/ 
Good  1  Good  1  Tariff  GDP  VK  v,. 
Licenses to K: 
w  = .5  ,538  ,510  ,019  ,169  .135  ,136 
w  =  1.0  ,482  ,398  ,060  ,161  ,138  .134 
w  = .5  ,620  ,116  -  ,088  ,148  ,097  .164 
w  =  1.0  ,486  ,355  .097  ,169  ,137  ,134 
w  = .5  ,518  ,453  ,086  ,211  .136  ,134 
0 = 1.0  ,495  .342  .114  ,172  .141  ,131 
Licenses to L: 
Licenses to foreigners: 
policies  vary,  depending  on  who  receives  the  profits  from  the  import 
licenses. There are several striking characteristics of  these results. To begin 
with,  the optimal nontariff  barriers  are very  high.  For example,  when the 
licenses are given to capital owners and w  = .5, the nontariff barrier leads to 
a domestic price of good  1 that is 53.8 percent above its price in the world 
market. The optimal nontariff barriers are more restrictive than the optimal 
tariff  barriers.  In fact, when the  licenses  must  be  given to foreigners,  the 
optimal  nontariff  barriers  are  prohibitive,  leading  to  autarky.  These  high 
barriers result in increased tax revenue from domestic production of good  1, 
which helps offset the lost tariff revenue. This increase in production of good 
1, which is capital intensive,  also helps capital owners to the point where 
they would normally prefer nontariff to tariff barriers.  In contrast, workers 
would normally prefer tariff barriers.  While social welfare is always higher 
with tariff  than  with nontariff  barriers,  the difference is often  very small, 
implying that  a country would  not put up much resistance to international 
pressure  to drop tariffs.  One other surprising result  is that capital  owners 
would rather have foreigners receive the import licenses rather than receiving 
the licenses themselves.  When  foreigners get the licenses, the government 
responds  by  prohibiting  imports,  leading  to  a  large  enough  increase  in 
demand  for the capital  intensive  good that the resulting rise  in the  rental 
price of capital more than offsets the loss in license revenue. 
Table  10.2  also  illustrates  a  general  contribution  to  the  literature  on 
tariff-quota  (non)equivalence. This literature has adopted  a partial  equilib- 
rium focus and has concentrated on the existence of uncertainty,  dynamics, 
or  imperfect  competition  to  generate  tariff-quota  nonequivalence.  By 
explicitly modeling quotas in a general equilibrium setting, we have shown 
that  the  presence  of  distorting  taxes  in  a  perfectly  certain  and  static 
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more general  treatment  of  this  phenomenon  is the  subject  of  forthcoming 
work by the authors. 
10.1.2 
The above  derivations  characterize  the  optimal  tadtariff policies  condi- 
tional on the  set of  tax and tariff  instruments used.  The choice of a set of 
policies depends on the pattern  of fixed costs for different combinations of 
tax instruments.  While theory alone cannot tell us the pattern  of these fixed 
costs, we propose  the following  simple story.  Under any tax  system, each 
taxpayer is monitored to some degree and audited with some probability.  To 
do this  requires  a certain  amount  of  skilled  manpower,  which  owing  to 
pressures  toward  factor  price  equalization  costs  roughly  the  same  in  all 
countries.  The  average  monitoring  cost  per  taxpayer  may  vary  across 
categories of  taxpayers,  however, depending, for example, on the complex- 
ity of the transactions involved.22 While the average  monitoring cost for a 
given  category  of  taxpayer  should  be roughly  the  same across  countries, 
however,  the  tax  revenue  collected  per  taxpayer  will  vary  substantially, 
depending primarily on the income level of the country. 
Within a country, the relative importance of monitoring costs, compared 
with revenue raised, is likely to vary substantially across categories of tax. It 
seems plausible to presume that border taxes collect a lot of revenue relative 
to  monitoring  costs  since  in  most  countries  relatively  few  people  are 
sufficient  to man  the  border.  Taxation  of  industrial  firms  is  also  likely  to 
collect a lot of revenue compared with monitoring costs, owing to the large 
size of most industrial firms.  In contrast, taxation of  retail outlets should be 
significantly more expensive, while a graduated personal income tax should 
be even more difficult to administer. 
In deciding on the optimal choice of  tax bases, a country would compare 
social welfare under each possible system since the choices are nonmarginal. 
The per capita efficiency and equity gains from shifting to a more flexible tax 
system are basically  proportional to the GDP per capita of a country, while 
the per capita increase in monitoring costs should be roughly  similar across 
countries.  Therefore,  richer  countries  would  be  expected  to  choose  more 
flexible  tax  systems than poorer  countries.  Since tariffs  plausibly  have the 
lowest  monitoring  costs  relative  to revenue  raised, this  story  leads  us  to 
expect that the poorest countries would rely primarily on tariffs, somewhat less 
poor countries  would  use production  taxes  as well,  while richer  countries 
should use a variety  of  other tax instruments,  such as retail sales taxes and 
personal income taxes. 23 
Therefore, the poorest  countries  should be  observed  discouraging  trade, 
owing to their reliance  on tariffs  to raise revenue.  As  seen in  table  10.1, 
however, the cost of using such a narrow tax case can be very high, implying 
that  government  revenue  will  be  a  small  fraction  of  GNP.  Somewhat  less 
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poor countries may either encourage or discourage trade on net. The figures 
in table  10.1 suggest that any distortion  is likely to be small, however,  in 
spite of the observed use of tariffs. These countries are likely to have a much 
larger government  sector than the poorest countries.  The gain from further 
broadening of the tax base seems to be quite modest, according to the figures 
in table  10.1. The richest countries,  which use the full complement  of tax 
instruments, have no reason to use tariffs unless they have market power, and 
they  can in  principle  make  use  of  this  market  power  without  relying  on 
tariffs. While other more detailed forecasts can be obtained from the theory, 
the data at this point are inadequate to test them. 
What does this model imply would happen  if  a country were to agree to 
eliminate  any explicit  tariffs?  Some countries  may  not  have  had  tariffs  to 
begin  with.  Even if  a country did have tariffs,  in principle it can eliminate 
the tariff yet duplicate its effects, for example, by cutting the production tax 
on each good by the original size of the tariff on that good and by raising the 
sales tax rate on the good by the same amount. However, these changes may 
create  extra  administrative  costs, which  may  not  be  worth the  price.  For 
example, if a country initially has a tax on production of good  1 and a tariff 
on imports of good 1 but no sales tax on good 1, what happens if the tariff is 
eliminated? Tariff revenue is lost, and in addition production of  good  1  will 
fall since imports are now cheaper, implying a drop in government revenue. 
This  increase  in  imports can  be offset  with  nontariff  barriers,  though  the 
revenue from tariffs  is still lost. Alternatively,  the government  can pay the 
fixed costs to expand its tax system. The net effect of eliminating tariffs on 
trade distortions will vary, depending on the set of taxes used after tariffs are 
eliminated.  The  results  in  our  numerical  example  suggest  that  trade 
distortions are not likely to be reduced significantly as a result of eliminating 
tariffs and may well get 
10.2  Estimates of Actual Trade Distortions 
Rather than developing a formal test of the above theory, our intent in this 
section  is  to  shed  light  on  the  actual  pattern  of  trade  distortions, taking 
account of both tariffs and the trade distortions  created by the domestic tax 
systems  in  various  countries.  We  begin  by  describing  the  data  and  their 
limitations.  We  then explain how  the data  are used  to investigate linkages 
between domestic taxes and border taxes. We conclude with the presentation 
and discussion of  the results. 
10.2.1  The Data and Their Limitations 
Our primary  data  source is  the  IMF’s  Government Financial  Statistics 
(GFS), which report total  tax  and nontax  revenue  collected  by  the  central 
government  in all major countries from  1970 to  1987. Several components 
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taxes, payroll  or manpower taxes, individual income taxes, domestic sales 
and  value  added  taxes  on goods  and  services,  import  duties,  and  export 
duties. These variables give a rough breakdown of  the share of government 
revenue from different sources but say nothing about the corresponding tax 
rates.  25 
In  order to obtain an estimate of  the tax rate associated with each tax, 
some estimate of the relevant tax base is necessary. We use the data from the 
IMF's International Finance Statistics (IFS), which provide national data on 
the levels of  imports and exports, private consumption, and GDP (all in the 
domestic currency).  We  also obtain data on population,  the exchange rate 
(domestic  currency  to  U.S.  dollar),  and  a  GDP  deflator  from  the  IFS. 
Finally, data on the  1980 share of GDP that is industrial output is obtained 
from the World Development Report (World Bank  1980). 
Tax rates are formed for each of the thirty-three countries in our sample as 
follows.26  The import tariff rate is given by import tariff revenue divided by 
value of imports. The export tax rate is analogously defined.27 Construction 
of other tax rates is less straightforward. 
The  production  tax  rate  is  intended  to  measure  the  degree  to  which 
relative  domestic  output  prices  are distorted  by  the  domestic tax  system, 
resulting  in a trade distortion.  Which of  the reported  taxes distort relative 
output  prices?  Presumably,  corporate  taxes  do so because  effective rates 
vary by  sector and because parts of the economy are noncorporate. While, 
in some circumstances, sales taxes may further distort the relative prices of 
domestic output, we do not have enough information to judge when this is 
the case.28 Similarly, personal  income tax rates and property tax rates may 
differ by industry. For example,  it is much easier to tax the labor income, 
capital  income,  or  capital  value  in  the  industrial  sector  than  to  tax  the 
income or capital  of  farmers and other self-employed  individual^.^^  Since 
any trade distortions created by  sales, personal  income,  and property taxes 
likely  vary  greatly  be  country  and  in  ways  that  are  unknown  given  the 
available data, we  chose  to  ignore  any  trade  distortions  created  by  these 
taxes.  A  further  question  concerns  how  to  treat  nontax  revenue.  This 
revenue  can come from  a variety  of  sources.  Our presumption was that  a 
primary  source  of  this  revenue  was  profits  from  state  enterprises  in  the 
industrial  sector.  We  therefore  chose  to  define  revenue  from  production 
taxes  to  equal  corporate  tax  revenue  plus  nontax  revenue.  To  the  extent 
that  nontax  revenue  comes  from  other  sources,  our  results  may  be 
mi~leading.~'  The tax base for the production  tax is taken  to be  industrial 
output.  The  resulting  figure  for  the  production  tax  rate,  which  equals 
production tax revenue divided by  industrial output, is therefore an average 
tax rate on industrial outp~t.~' 
Industrial output is itself a constructed variable for years other than  1980. 
We  first regress  the  1980 industrial  share of  GDP on real per capita GDP 
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for the industrial share (Iso) as a seed value, we create a time series of I  for 
each country according to the relation: 
where the a’s are from the estimated regression.  The production tax rate is 
then set equal to reported production tax revenue divided by the product of 
GDP and our estimate of the industrial share of  GDP. 
Given the  various  strong assumptions  that  must  be  made  to construct  a 
production tax rate from the available data, we also construct two alternative 
measures of the production tax rate. In one alternative measure,  we exclude 
nontax  revenue.  Since nontax revenue can come from a variety of sources, 
we  want  to  check  on the  role  of  nontax  revenue  in  our results.  We  also 
compute  production  tax rates using GDP instead of  the  industrial share of 
GDP as the  tax  base.  For  richer  countries,  this  may  yield  more  accurate 
rates. 
Finally,  we compute sales tax rates  and individual  income  tax  rates.  In 
each  case,  we  use  GDP as  the  tax  base.  Revenues  from  sales  taxes  are 
reported  on the GFS tape.  We  take revenues  from payroll taxes as well as 
revenues collected from individuals as the revenue of our income tax. These 
very  gross  approximations  are  presented  only  to  give  some  feel  for  the 
structure of tax rates other than trade or production tax rates. 
We  made  no  attempt  to  measure  nontariff  barriers  (NTBs).  Nogues, 
Olechowski,  and Winters (1986) report the percentage of  trade affected by 
NTBs in sixteen industrial countries but say nothing about the implicit tariff 
rates associated  with  these NTBs. Learner  (1988) presents  a thorough and 
amusing  account  of  the  problems  associated  with  attempting  to carefully 
construct a more satisfactory NTB data base.  Countries may  differ in their 
reliance  on  tariff  versus  nontariff  barriers  to  trade.  As  a  result,  observed 
differences  in the use of  tariffs  across countries  at  a given  date, or across 
time for a given country, may  provide  a very  misleading indication of the 
differences  in  tariff  plus  nontariff  barriers.  Similarly,  we  know  virtually 
nothing  about  nontax  distortions  within  the  domestic  economy.  Many 
countries, for example, have regulations causing agricultural prices to differ 
systematically from marginal costs, yet  we would not know  this  given  the 
available data. 
In addition,  from these data alone, we know nothing about which goods 
are subject to tariffs  and production taxes. On the basis of the theory, what 
we  want  to  measure  is  the  difference  between  the  tariff  rate  and  the 
production  tax  rate  for  each  good.  Aggregate  revenue  figures  from 
production taxes and tariffs shed no light on these differences. For example, 
if  production  of  only  industrial  goods  is taxed  and  imports of  agricultural 
goods are taxed, the implied distortions are very different than if both taxes 
and  tariffs  apply  only  to  industrial  goods,  yet  we cannot tell  these  two 
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10.2.2  Application of the Data to the Model 
Even if  we  knew  everything about the domestic tax  system, there is  a 
further conceptual question concerning how to measure the size of any trade 
distortion. All we have claimed so far is that there are no trade distortions if 
a marginal increase in the output in one industry at the expense of output in 
any  other  industry,  holding  aggregate factor  supplies constant,  does not 
affect the value of  domestic output in  the world market. To  the extent that 
this is not the case, trade patterns are distorted. 
There are a variety of  ways of  measuring the extent to which marginal 
reallocations of  resources can lead to a change in the value of  total output, 
measured at world prices. For example, in a two-good setting, extra output 
in one industry can be produced with many different combinations of  factor 
movements from the other industry. If  production had  been efficient, any 
marginal change has no effect on the value of  total output. If  production 
were not efficient, however, then the resulting change in  the value of  total 
output would  depend  on  the  composition of  the  factors that  are  shifted 
between industries. The approach that we adopt is to measure the change in 
the value of  total  output  if  industry  1 produces one more  unit,  using  its 
existing technology, with industry 2 then using whatever factors are left. We 
will use this change in the value of total output as an estimate of the size of 
any trade distortions. 
These trade distortions arise from domestic taxes and tariffs in our model. 
In order to simplify the interpretation  of the resulting measure, we use the same 
normalizations of the tax law described in section 10.1. In particular, we set 
the tax rate on the output of industry 2 and the tariff on imports of good 2 at 
zero, making the required adjustments in the other tax and tariff rates. In 
addition, we now allow for factor taxes at the firm level, with rates varying 
by firm, in addition to the factor taxes faced by individuals. However, we define 
the individual tax on each factor to equal the combined firm and individual 
factor tax rates in industry 2, thereby by construction setting the firms’ factor 
tax rates in industry 2 equal to zero. This normalization then defines the factor 
tax rates in industry 1. Let the resulting tax rate on inputs of factorj  in industry 
i equal yij, and let the resulting required before-tax rate of return on factor j 
in industry i equal sU. 
If industry 1 expands output by one unit, using its existing technology, and 
industry 2 loses these inputs, then the change in the value of total output, 
denoted A, equals 
But competitive behavior implies that piaf/aKij  =  rj/(l  - yii), while 
competitive pricing  implies that pi*=pi(l +  ~~)/(l  +  ti). Using these 
expressions to simplify equation @a), given the above normalizations, we 
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But this expression simply equals the sum of all the extra taxes due if output 
of the first good increases by a unit and imports of  this good decrease by a 
unit, with output and imports of good 2 changing as required. Equation (8b) 
then  describes our measure of  the extent of  any trade distortions. We  will 
need  to  be  careful  in  using  it,  however,  because  of  the  various  normal- 
izations of  the tax and tariff rates. 
In  making  use of  the  available data  to estimate  the  extent  of  any trade 
distortions,  we make the following assumptions.  First, we assume that each 
economy  consists  of  two  sectors,  an  urban  industrial  sector  and  an 
agricultural  sector.  We  assume  that  production  tax  revenue  is  collected 
entirely from firms in the industrial sector.33 To the extent that other sectors 
are subject to production taxes, our results will be misleading. For example, 
at least in the richer countries, services and other primarily nontraded goods 
may  well form an important part of the production tax base. A production 
tax on nontraded  goods is equivalent  to a consumption  tax on these goods 
and  does  not  distort  the  efficiency  with  which  the  existing  output  is 
produced.  Therefore,  to  the  extent  to  which  services  are  subject  to  the 
production tax, this part of the revenue should not in principle be included in 
our measure of  the trade distortion created by the production tax. 
We  measured the average tax rate on imports and the average tax rate on 
exports  as  discussed  above.  Let  e  denote  the  export  tax  rate,  so  that 
(1  +  e)p,  =p'  on whatever good  i is exported, and let t'  denote the tariff rate 
on imports. Then, when we renormalize the tariff rates to set the export tax 
rate to zero, the resulting tariff rate, t, equals t'  + e(1 + t'). We  made no 
attempt to capture the presence of nontariff  barriers. 
Whether  tariffs  offset  the  trade  distortion  created  by  the  production  tax 
depends  on whether  the  country  exports or imports  industrial  goods.  If  it 
imports these goods, then the production tax encourages trade, whereas if it 
exports these goods, then the production tax discourages trade.  In contrast, 
when  tariffs  collect  positive  revenue,  they  serve  to  discourage  trade. 
Therefore,  the  two  distortions offset  if  industrial  goods are imported  and 
reinforce if industrial goods are exported. Unfortunately, we have no data on 
the composition of each country's exports and imports. We  therefore made 
the crude assumption  that  the  countries  in the richest  two quintiles export 
industrial  goods  to  countries  in  the  poorest  three  q~intiles.~~  Given  our 
assumption that industrial goods are imported in the countries in the poorest 
three quintiles,  production  taxes  in these  countries  encourage  international 
trade, offsetting  the  effects of  any  tariffs.  Therefore, the  net  distortion  to 
trade,  as shown in equation (8b), is the tariff rate minus the production tax 
rate. In the countries in the richest two quintiles,  however, we assume that 
industrial goods are exported, in which case the production tax discourages 379  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
international  trade, reinforcing  the effects of  any tariff.  Therefore,  the net 
distortion to trade in these countries equals the tariff rate plus the production 
tax rate.35 
10.2.3  Data Analysis and Results 
In this paper, we simply report our estimates of various average tax rates 
and  the  implied  net  trade  distortions  and  do not  attempt  a  more  formal 
statistical  test  of  the  above  theory.  Given  the  many  weaknesses  of  the 
available data, any more ambitious use of the data seemed ir~appropriate.~~ 
Table 10.3 illustrates the structure of tax rates in  1980, reporting results 
for five groups of countries divided according to their per capita GDP.37 The 
table reports the mean tax rate (and its standard deviation) within each group 
of countries for each tax as well as the implied trade distortion. The cell for 
the first row and first column, for example, tells us that the countries in our 
sample that fall into the bottom quintile of per capita income have on average 
a tariff rate of 21.4 percent. The same tax rate for countries falling in the top 
quintile of per capita income is only 1.6 percent. 
The first row of  table  10.3 gives the import tax rate,  t'. The second row 
gives the export tax rate, e, while the third row corresponds to the net border 
distortion, t'  + e(1 + t'). The fourth row of table 10.3 give the production 
tax rate as described above. The fifth row then provides a summary measure 
of  the  net  trade  distortion,  based  on our assumption  that  only  industrial 
goods are subject to the production tax and that these goods are imported by 
countries in  the  poorest  three  quintiles  and  exported  by  countries  in  the 
richest two quintiles. A positive value for the net trade distortion implies that 
on average the combination of trade and domestic production  taxes acts to 
discourage trade. 
The sixth and seventh rows report alternative measures of the production 
tax rate.  The production tax rate reported in the sixth row excludes nontax 
revenue  from the tax revenues,  while  the rate reported in the seventh row 
used GDP instead  of  just industrial  GDP as the tax  base.  The eighth row 
gives a rough estimate of sales tax rates.38 The ninth row provides an equally 
rough estimate of income tax rates. The tenth row gives government revenue 
as a share of GDP. The bottom row gives the average per capita GDP of  the 
countries in each of the quintiles. 
The  results  tend  to  support  several  of  the  predictions  of  the  theory 
developed in section 10.1, In particular, we find the following. 
1. As  countries become richer,  import tariff  rates  in particular  and  net 
border distortions in general decline. This is illustrated in the first and third 
rows of the table 10.3. Import tax rates monotonically decline from a high of 
21.4 percent in the poorest quintile of countries to a low of 1.6 percent in the 
richest quintile. Net border distortions similarly decline (although not quite 
monotonically) from 26.9 percent to only 1.7 percent. The nonmonotonicity 
in the decline of net border distortions is due to an unusually high export tax 380  Roger H. GordoniJames Levinsohn 
Table 10.3  The Structure of Tax Rates 
Rank for Variable GDPREAL 
1  2  3  4  5 
Import tariff rate: 
Mean  ,214  ,153 
SD  .lo3  ,053 
Mean  .049  ,047 
SD  ,084  ,046 
Mean  .269  ,208 
SD  ,083  ,097 
Mean  ,196  ,150 
SD  .I06  ,062 
Mean  .073  ,058 
SD  .I47  ,117 
Mean  ,087  ,061 
SD  ,059  ,029 
Mean  ,054  .050 
SD  ,036  ,024 
Mean  ,026  ,021 
SD  ,022  ,018 
Mean  ,015  ,029 
SD  .009  ,030 
Mean  ,213  ,187 
SD  ,077  ,070 
Mean  370.133  976.392 
SD  122.40  1  256.489 
Export tax rate: 
Net border distortion: 
Production tax rate: 
Net trade distortion: 
Production tax rate excluding nontax revenue: 
Production tax rate with GDP as base: 
Sales tax rate: 
“Income”  tax rate: 
Government revenue share of  GDP: 
GDP/population in  1980 US$: 
,083 
.027 
.  I34 
,156 






























































rate in the third quintile, but this value  has a very high  standard deviation 
associated  with  it. This is consistent  with  the notion  that  poorer  countries 
tend  to  rely  more  heavily  on  border  taxes  to  fund  public  expenditure. 
Without other sources of  revenue, as illustrated, for example, in table 10.1, 
tariff  rates  are fairly high. When countries are richer  and as a result  use  a 
broader range of domestic taxes, border tax rates fall appreciably. 
2. Poorer countries seem to have much higher net border distortions than 
net trade distortions. Net border distortions in the poorest three quintiles of 
countries appear fairly high (26.9,  20.8, and 23.1 percent, respectively),  yet 381  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
our estimates of  the  net  trade distortions  are significantly  lower (7.3, 5.8, 
and 10.5 percent, respectively). Tariffs are to a large extent simply offsetting 
the  distortions  of  domestic  production  taxes  (and  vice  versa).  Net  border 
distortions  cannot  be  viewed  to  be  a  good  approximation  to  net  trade 
distortions. 
3. The richer countries have virtually  no border distortions  yet  still have 
significant  production  taxes  and  so have  significant  net  trade  distortions. 
Since richer countries impose very low border taxes, their taxes on domestic 
production serve to distort trade patterns.  Given our assumption that richer 
countries export industrial goods, which are subject to the production  tax, 
this production tax discourages international trade, serving the same role as a 
tariff. 
To  the  degree  to  which  production  taxes  are  assessed  on  nonindustrial 
goods, our estimates of the net trade distortion are biased upward. However, 
our  figures  also  ignore  nontariff  barriers  to  trade  and  to  that  degree 
underestimate net trade distortions. 
4.  Richer  countries  levy  a broader  range  of  taxes  and  collect  more  tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP. Rows 8 and 9 indicate that effective sales 
tax and income tax rates generally rise with a country’s income. The income 
tax  rate  rises  from  1.5 percent  in the  poorest  quintile  to 7 percent  in  the 
richest quintile, while the sales tax rate rises from 2.6 percent to 5.4 percent. 
Owing to the construction of  these tax rate variables,  this result is probably 
due more to the larger tax bases in the richer countries than to their higher 
tax rates. It is no surprise, then, that government revenue as a share of GDP 
rises from 21.3 percent in the poorest quintile to 28.1 percent in the richest 
quintile. 
5. Nontax revenues are an important source of revenue for rich and poor 
countries.  We  have  assumed  that  nontax  revenues  are  derived  from state- 
owned industrial firms. Without very detailed country-specific information on 
government fiscal structure, this assumption is difficult to substantiate. Insofar 
as the assumption is valid,  nontax revenue is a quantitatively important part 
of production tax revenues for countries in every income quintile. Exclusion 
of nontax revenues from the calculation of the production tax, shown in row 
6, reduces the production tax rate by about half for each quintile. 
6. Except  for the  countries  in the  richest  and poorest  quintiles, there is 
much intraquintile variance of net trade distortions. Only in the fifth quintile 
is the standard deviation of the net trade distortion even as small as half the 
mean value of  this  distortion.  While comments  1-5  above illustrate  some 
broad  trends, one should refrain  from assuming  too much  homogeneity  of 
tax structures within quintiles. 
Table 10.4 gives country-specific information about net border distortions, 
production tax rates, and the resulting net trade distortion. Each entry in the 
table is the time-series  average for a variable  across  those  years  in  which 
enough data were available to calculate the net trade distortion. 382  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
Table 10.4  The Composition of  the Net Trade Distortion 
Government 
Net Border  Production  Net Trade  Revenue Share 
1980  Distortion  Tax Rate  Distortion  of GDP 
GDP 
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In some cases, there  are obvious explanations for why  a country’s tax 
patterns differ from those of other countries in the same income quintile. For 
example,  much of  the production  tax  revenue  in  Venezuela  likely  comes 
from the taxation of oil exports, explaining the high calculated value for this 
production  tax.  Malaysia  is  another  oil-exporting  country  with  a  high 
production tax rate. Here, the production  tax revenue is presumably  mainly 
from  a  tax  on  exported  rather  than  imported  goods,  contrary  to  our 
assumptions. It is interesting to note that Brazil, which has a reputation  for 
restrictive policies,  has no estimated net trade di~tortion.~~ 383  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
Countries that are members of  the EEC  have uniformly very  small net 
border  distortions  These  countries  generally  have  sizable  production 
taxes, however, giving rise to important net trade distortions. 
Even for data within a country, there are often high standard deviations, 
implying significant changes in policy over the period  of  observation. In 
future  work,  we  hope to  investigate the  degree to  which changes  in net 
border distortions and changes in net production taxes were coordinated so 
as to leave net trade distortions relatively unaffected. 
10.3  Conclusions 
What can optimal tax theory tell us about the optimal trade policy of  a 
country? Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed that, if  all excise taxes are 
available, then production will be efficient under an optimal tax system. This 
implies in a small open economy that there should be no trade distortions if 
all excise taxes are available. While there may be no net trade distortions, 
however, tariffs could well be used to offset the trade distortions created by 
various domestic taxes. 
Administrative costs may restrict the set of  tax instruments that a country 
would  consider using.  If  fewer tax  instruments are used,  however,  then 
trade distortions may well exist under an optimal tax system. We  find that 
the optimal trade distortions in small open economies can be of either sign. 
Richer small countries would likely use  a broader set of  tax instruments, 
however,  implying that  trade distortions are  more  likely in  poorer  small 
countries  as  well  as  in  countries  with  market  power  in  international 
markets. 
We  used the IMF financial statistics for thirty countries during the period 
1970-87 to examine the size and pattern of net trade distortions. These data 
suggest that net border distortions are much larger than net trade distortions 
in  countries  in  the  poorer  three  quintiles.  Countries in  the  richest  two 
quintiles,  however,  have  very  small  border  distortions  yet  still  have 
significant trade distortions created by  their domestic taxes. It is likely that 
these distortions discourage trade. Our numbers suggest roughly comparable 
net  trade  distortions across countries at  all  income  levels,  even  though 
border  distortions are  important in  only the  poorest  countries. The  data 
therefore  suggest  that  the  GATT  restrictions on  border  taxes  have  been 
relatively ineffective in eliminating trade distortions in richer countries. 
It is possible, however, that the net trade distortions in richer countries 
may  not necessarily arise from the exercise of  market power and  may  not 
result in  important reallocations of  resources. Our theory forecasts that tax 
competition  between  countries  with  no  market  power  should  drive 
production taxes to zero, assuming that GATT agreements have eliminated 
border  taxes.  However,  the  optimal  tax  framework  examines  the  Nash 384  Roger H. Gordon/James Levinsohn 
equilibrium  in which each country  chooses its optimal tax policy, taking as 
given  the  tax  policies  elsewhere.  As  discussed  in  Gordon  (1983), 
coordination  of  tax policies  across countries  would  lead to higher  welfare. 
For example, if all countries agreed to impose production  taxes at the same 
rate,  then  the  location  of  production  remains  undistorted  by  taxes,  yet 
countries  may  find  the  resulting  tax  system more attractive  on equity or 
efficiency  grounds.  Certainly,  no  explicit  agreement  exists  coordinating 
production taxes across countries. Recent experience in the EEC shows how 
difficult it is to convince countries to restrict by international agreement their 
flexibility  in  setting  domestic  tax  rates.  Yet  game  theory  shows  that 
cooperative outcomes could arise without explicit agreements. Certainly, the 
observed  simultaneous  reduction  in  corporate  taxes  in  many  developed 
countries,  around the  time  of  the  1986 tax  reform  in  the  United  States, 
suggests such  an  informal  coordination  of  tax  policies.  In  addition,  the 
characteristics  of  international  tax  treaties  suggest  a  concern  for  world 
efficiency. It is premature to conclude that these countries are using tariffs to 
exercise market power. 
There is certainly much room for further research on the linkages between 
domestic and international  taxes. We  are currently  looking  more closely  at 
the optimal  use of  nontariff  barriers  in the presence  of  distorting domestic 
taxes.  We  also hope to collect much better information  about the pattern of 
net  trade  distortions,  using  detailed  information  on  tariff  rates  versus 
production  tax rates  by  good in various countries. In addition, we hope to 
examine what  readjustments  occurred in  domestic taxes  in countries that 
have made major changes in tariff and nontariff  barriers to trade. Finally, we 
hope  to  learn  more  about  the  degree  to  which  production  taxes  are 
coordinated  among countries  in  order to minimize  trade  distortions while 
still allowing use of this source of tax revenue. 
Appendix 
The objective of this appendix is to derive equations (6)-(7).  This derivation 
is very similar to  those appearing elsewhere in the optimal tax literature. 
Equations (6a) and (6b) characterize the values of u  and r that maximize 
the expression in equation (5). Differentiating equation (5) with respect to u, 
we find that 
Note that factor prices and the firms'  output price, pI,  do not change when u 
changes. By Roy's  identity,  aVh/dqI =  -cihChI,  where cih is the marginal 
utility  of  income  of  the  hth  household.  Let  CU  = Zh  ah/H.  If  we  then 385  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
substitute the expression - [&  +  (ah -  &)]ch1  for dvh/aq, in equation 
(Al) and simplify, we get 
But, by  the definition of  a covariance, &(a,, -  &)Ch]=  H  cov(ah, Chi). 
Using  this  result,  equation  (6a)  follows  from  equation  (A2) by  simply 
dividing through by pTC,  and making use of the definition of  ey. 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to T, we find that 
By Roy's identity, dVh/drj = CihKhj. In addition, however, if we differentiate 
each of the two cost functions described in equation (1) with respect to T and 
sum the total derivatives, we find that 
Proceeding  as above, and making use of  this additional result,  we quickly 
get equation (6b). 
In  order to  derive equation  (7), note  that  the  assumption that  utility  is 
additively separable between consumption and factor supplies implies that 
But, bythedefinitionOfPh,, dChi/dYh = Phl/ql = [pi + (Phi -  p1)]/q1. After 
substituting this expression, we find that 
Using equation (A4) and the definition that Yh =  cjrjKhj, equation (7) follows 
quickly. 
Notes 
1. This basic idea is not new, having been discussed in the literature at least since 
2. Even labor income taxes can distort relative prices of  domestic products to the 
Bhagwati (1971). 
extent that the effective tax rates vary by industry. 386  Roger H. GordodJames Levinsohn 
3. For a discussion of GATT rules, see Dam (1970). 
4. Yitzhaki (1979), Wilson (1988), and Panagariya (1988) also explore the optimal 
size of  the tax base, when a broader base implies higher administrative costs, though 
in  a closed economy setting. 
5. Mitra (1987) and Heady and Mitra (1987) also examined some aspects of  the 
linkage between domestic and border taxes. 
6. These models try to explain which groups will be favored by government policy, 
unlike optimal tax  models,  which simply assume an  objective for the government. 
Conditional on the resulting distributional preferences,  the two types of  models are 
likely to make very similar policy forecasts. The optimal tax models simply describe 
the Pareto-efficient policies, given the desired distribution. 
7. Trade theorists will recognize this as the notion that international trade extends 
the consumption possibility frontier. 
8. We  ignore taxes on consumption since a tax on the consumption of a good can 
be  duplicated with a production tax and a tariff at the same rate on imports of this 
good. 
9. With  trade  in  both  goods  and  one  of  the  factors,  and  with  factors  mobile 
between industries, a country would almost always specialize production to only one 
of the two goods, eliminating various effects we wish to focus on. 
10. If good i is exported rather than imported and exports are taxed, then it would 
be more natural to define an export tax rate, e,,  such that q,(l + e,) = p*. Then, I,= 
-eJ(I  + et). 
11. Article 3 under GATT allows a rebate of indirect taxes, such as a VAT,  when a 
good is exported, thereby eliminating any trade distortions from the tax. Doing the 
same  for  a  turnover  tax  is  very  difficult  since  the  appropriate  size  of  the  rebate 
depends  on  the  degree  to  which  intermediate  inputs  in  a product  are  transferred 
between firms in the course of production. 
12. To the degree that taxpayers are more aggressive at evading taxes when there is 
more money at stake, monitoring may become more expensive as rates rise, though 
higher penalties could substitute imperfectly for extra monitoring. 
13. For a derivation of equations (6a), (6b), and (7), see the appendix. 
14. The  efficiency  loss  measure  therefore  takes  the  form  of  a  tax  rate,  which 
measures the difference between marginal benefits and costs for the good, times the 
change in quantity of the good. 
15. In general, the value of  Phl will depend on consumer prices and income. 
16. Firms in industry 2 must continue to break even. Output prices are unchanged; 
the cost of  one input has fallen, so the cost of  the  other  input must have risen  in 
equilibrium. This  is  simply  a  manifestation  of  the  Stolper-Samuelson  theorem  of 
international trade. 
17. Distributional objectives may differ across countries, however. 
18. This  equivalence  assumes  perfect  competition,  no  uncertainty,  and  a  static 
economic  environment.  Relaxation  of  any  of  these  assumptions  may  result  in 
tariff-quota nonequivalence.  The models used  in the rent-seeking literature can also 
lead to this result. For example, if  money is used to bribe officials to obtain licenses, 
then the equilibrium bribe should be the market clearing price for a license, and the 
official wage rate of officials would in principle adjust to clear the labor market. 
19. In fact, we have been able to show in this situation that a prohibitive nontariff 
barrier is at least a local optimum under plausible assumptions.  Reducing the trade 
barrier  slightly  from this  point  reduces  tax  revenue  from domestic  production  yet 
does not result in any savings on goods previously purchased from abroad since there 
were none. 
20. When o =  1.5, the optimal net tariff rate is so high that good  1 is exported 
rather than imported. 387  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
21. The incentive effects of these taxes can be duplicated using a sales tax on each 
good, at separate rates, along with either a tariff or a production tax  on good  1. 
22. We  have assumed that the cost does not depend on the chosen tax rate. 
23. For empirical results consistent with these  hypotheses,  see Tanzi (1987)  and 
Riezman and Slemrod (1987). 
24. Judging  whether  world  efficiency  improves  is  very  complicated  in  this 
second-best setting, given the presence of many tax distortions. 
25. A cross-sectional regression analysis relating the share of revenue from each 
source (relative to GDP and relative to total tax revenue) to a measure of  national 
income is provided in Tanzi (1987). 
26.  We  selected a cross section of countries. The thirty-three countries initially in 
our sample were  Argentina,  Brazil,  Cameroon,  Canada,  Chile,  Colombia, Egypt, 
France,  Germany,  Ghana,  Greece,  India,  Indonesia,  Italy,  Japan,  Kenya,  Korea, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  the  Netherlands,  Nicaragua,  Pakistan,  Peru,  the  Philippines, 
Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, 
and the United States.  Owing to lack of data on imports and exports,  we dropped 
Chile,  Indonesia,  and  Uruguay  from  the  sample.  The  countries  were  selected  as 
follows. We  first included a handful of countries that underwent trade liberalization. 
These countries are important for future work with the data set. We  then randomly 
selected countries from the list of countries in the World Development Report. 
27.  For several industrial countries, there were no data on export tax duties. The 
GFS do not allow us to determine  whether this is simply a missing observation or 
whether  zero  revenue  was  collected.  Rather  than  exclude  all  industrial  countries 
except the United Kingdom from the analysis, we set these missing values to zero. 
28.  A sales tax would distort relative output prices if  it is assessed on the basis of 
domestic output rather than domestic consumption, if  the rate differs by industry, and 
if  no  compensating  adjustment  takes  place  at  the  border.  In  addition,  sales  of 
domestic producers and sales of importers might be taxed differently. The European 
VAT  does include  compensating  border  adjustments  and  so does not distort  trade 
patterns. 
29. For a discussion of  how sales and income taxes can distort relative producer 
prices, see Ahmad and Stem (1987). 
30. For example, nontax revenue may come from agricultural marketing boards. If 
the  revenue  from  these  boards  results  from  higher  prices  charged  for  domestic 
agricultural output, then this change in relative prices offsets rather than reinforces 
the distortion created by the corporate income tax. If the revenue comes solely from 
higher prices on  exports  of  agricultural  goods,  then  this revenue  reflects a higher 
effective tariff rate rather than a higher effective production tax rate. 
31. This type of  average tax rate is often used to measure  tax distortions.  See, 
e.g., Fullerton et al. (1981).  However, as emphasized by Auerbach (1983),  it has a 
variety of problems. For example, the size of the tax distortion created by a corporate 
tax depends on the present value of  depreciation deductions and tax credits that result 
when an investment is undertaken. But the observed use of depreciation deductions 
and  tax  credits  in  a  given  year  depends  heavily  on  the  particular  timing  of 
investments that occurred in the economy. 
32. The resulting regression is IND SHARE = .2925 + 3.160E - 5  * GDP - 
2.136.F - 9  * GDP ** 2.  Each coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
95  percent level. These coefficients imply that the industrial share of GDP rises with 
GDP until real (1980)  per capita income reaches about U.S.$7,400  and then falls. 
33. Our  derivation  of  the  measure  of  trade  distortions  implies that  we  need  to 
know only the revenue collected from this tax, relative to output, and not the extent 
to which it is a tax on output, capital income, or some other tax base, as long as it is 
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34.  Of  course, this crude assumption will be violated  in a variety of cases.  For 
example, poorer countries that export petroleum and minerals often impose taxes on 
these exported goods.  In  fact, optimal  tax  theory would  support taxation of  these 
goods, even without market power in international markets, since a tax at a constant 
rate on this output acts as a land tax and to that extent has no efficiency cost and 
perhaps an equity gain. 
35.  Since the tariff and the production tax apply to different goods, we implicitly 
renormalize  the  production  tax  rates  by  setting  the  renormalized  tax  rate  in  the 
industrial sector to zero and setting the tax in the remaining sector equal to minus the 
measured production tax rate. 
36.  We  adopt a descriptive  approach  for two interrelated reasons.  First,  as sec. 
10.1 demonstrates,  there are  few truly exogenous  and observable  variables  in our 
analysis.  Given this, simple single-equation regression analysis will provide biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Second, the severe measurement problems with our data 
make any interpretation of regression results highly problematic. 
37. When data needed to calculate the net trade distortion were not available in 
1980, which  was  the  case  for three  countries, we  report  the  data  from the  latest 
available year instead. 
38.  If  data were not available in  1980 for one of the following variables, we use 
data from the latest year available. For four countries, no data were ever available for 
sales tax revenues.  The reported  sales tax  rate is therefore  the average over those 
countries with available data. 
39. The inclusion of NTBs may alter this conclusion. 
40.  The lack of any border distortion is mildly surprising since, while intra-EEC 
trade is free, trade between EEC countries and the rest of  the world need not be. 
References 
Ahmad, Ehtisham, and Nicholas Stem. 1987. Alternative sources of government revenue: 
Examples from India. In The theory of  taxation for developing countries, ed. David 
Newbery and Nicholas Stern, 281-332.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Aizenman,  Joshua.  1987. Inflation,  tariffs  and  tax  enforcement  costs.  Journal  of 
International Economic Integration 2: 12-28. 
Auerbach, Alan J. 1983. Corporate taxation in the United States. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity  2:451-514. 
Bhagwati,  Jagdish.  1971.  The  generalized  theory  of  distortions  and  welfare.  In 
Trade, balance of payments,  and growth, ed. J. Bhagwati, R. Jones, R. Mundell, 
and J. Vanek. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
-  .  1982. Directly  unproductive,  profit-seeking  (DUP)  activities.  Journal  of 
Political  Economy 90(5):988-  1002. 
Boadway, R., S. Maital,  and M. Prachowny.  1973. Optimal  tariffs, optimal taxes 
and public goods. Journal of Public Economics 2:391-403. 
Corden,  W.  Max.  1974.  Trade  policy  and  economic  welfare.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press. 
-  . 1984. Normative theory of international trade. In Handbook of international 
economics, vol.  1, ed. R. W.  Jones and P.  B. Kenen. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Dam, Kenneth W.  1970. The GATT: Law and  international economic organization. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Diamond, Peter, and James Mirrlees.  1971. Optimal taxation and public production. 
I. Production efficiency. American Economic Review 61%-27. 389  Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes 
Dixit,  Avinash.  1985. Tax  policy for open economies.  In  The handbook of  public 
economics, vol.  1, ed. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Fullerton, D., A. King, J. Shoven, and J. Whalley.  1981. Corporate tax integration 
in the United States: A general equilibrium approach. American Economic Review 
Gordon,  Roger H.  1983.  An  optimal  taxation  approach  to  fiscal  federalism. 
Quarterly Journal of  Economics 98567-86. 
Grossman,  G., and  J. D.  Richardson.  1985.  Strategic  trade  policy:  A  survey  of 
issues  and  early  analysis.  Special  Papers  in  International  Economics  no.  15. 
International Finance Section, Department of  Economics,  Princeton University. 
Heady, C., and  P.  Mitra.  1987. Distributional  and  revenue  raising  arguments  for 
tariffs. Journal of  Development Economics 26:77-  101. 
Helpman, Elhanan.  1984. Increasing returns, imperfect markets, and trade theory. In 
The  handbook  of  international  economics,  vol.  1, ed.  R. W.  Jones  and  P.  B. 
Kenen. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
71:677-91. 
Learner, Edward. 1988. Notes on estimating nontariff barriers. Typescript. 
Mitra, P.  1987. Protective and revenue raising trade taxes: Theory and an application 
to India. World Bank CPD Discussion Paper no.  1987-4. 
Nogues, J., A. Olechowski, and L. A. Winters. 1986. The extent of nontariff barriers to 
imports of industrial countries. World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 789. 
Panagariya, Arvind.  1988. Administrative costs, optimal taxation,  and the tax base. 
Mimeo. 
Riezman, Raymond, and Joel Slemrod. 1987. Tariffs and collection costs. Review of 
World Economics, 545-49. 
Tanzi,  Vito.  1987.  Quantitative  characteristics  of  the  tax  systems  of  developing 
countries.  In The theory of  taxation for developing countries, ed. David Newbery 
and Nicholas Stem. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, John D.  1988. On the optimal tax base for commodity taxation. Mimeo. 
World Bank. 1980. World development report 1980. Oxford: Oxford Univerjity Press. 
Yitzhaki,  Shlomo.  1979.  A  note  on  optimal  taxation  and  administrative  costs. 
American Economic Review 69:475 -  80. 
Comment  John Whalley 
I enjoyed reading this paper because of the insights that it yields on the role 
of  domestic  taxes  in  shaping  the  tariff  structure of  countries,  especially 
poorer  and  smaller  countries.  Because  of  the  focus  of  my  own  recent 
research on GATT-related issues, my comments largely relate to the broader 
factual context within which the paper is set. 
Summary of  Paper 
The focus of the paper is to try to explain why smaller and poorer countries 
tend to have higher tariffs and associated trade barriers than do larger countries. 
The paper poses this as something of  a paradox since optimal tariff theory 
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would suggest that it would be large countries that would have high tariffs and 
small countries that would have lower tariffs. 
The  conjectures  offered  are  twofold.  The  first  is  that  tariffs  are 
administratively  more  efficient  as  revenue-raising  devices  than  domestic 
taxes for lower-income countries,  explaining in part why tariffs are used so 
extensively by them. In turn,  administrative considerations,  to some extent, 
determine  the  form  that  domestic  taxes  take  in  these  countries,  and, 
therefore, tariffs become a way of offsetting the trade distortions  associated 
with border taxes. 
The paper contains a theoretical section in which the authors lay out the 
optimal tariff/domestic tax problem for the small open price-taking economy 
case, demonstrating  the well-known  and not  surprising proposition that the 
optimal policy for such a country is to have no border distortions. They then 
proceed to analyze cases with administrative costs and illustrate how this can 
lead to a presumption for a differential tariff. Moreover, there may be a need 
for a tariff to offset trade distortions  associated with domestic taxes, which 
may arise from differential administrative costs of  taxing different products. 
They  then  proceed  to  numerical  analysis,  in  which  they  present  an 
example  in which  there  are Cobb-Douglas  production  and  utility  functions 
and two consumer groups, capitalists and workers, with differing distribution 
weights in the social welfare function.  The government maximizes a social 
welfare  function  that  includes  revenue  since  this  is  redistributed  to  the 
households.  Their numerical results clearly show that the optimal tariff will 
tend to increase as capitalists are given more weight in the utility  function. 
Also,  distorting  trade  taxes  or subsidies  may  be  a  desirable  arrangement 
depending  on  the  weights  in  the  preferences.  Finally,  they  show  that 
eliminating  tariffs,  leaving  production  taxes  in place, does  not  necessarily 
eliminate trade distortions. 
The  authors  draw  out  some  of  the  implications  of  this  analysis  for 
observed  tax  policies.  They  suggest  that  the  poorest  countries,  generally 
speaking, will  adopt policies that  discourage  trade owing to their need  for 
higher tariffs,  a need that is due to the administrative costs.  In turn,  tariffs 
may also be needed  to offset distorting  effects of taxes.  They then  analyze 
data  from  IMF government  statistics  for  1970-87  and  calculate  average 
commodity  tax  rates  for  thirty-three  countries,  emphasizing  that  little  is 
known about quantitative measures of nontariff  barriers,  citing the work of 
Nogues, Olechowski,  and Winters. 
They conclude by running a series of regressions,  emphasizing six major 
themes from their results. The first is that, as countries become richer, both 
tariff and border tax rates generally decline.  Second, poorer countries seem 
to have  much  higher  border  and  trade  distortions. Third, richer  countries 
have  small if  no  border  distortions  yet  still  have  production  taxes  and  so 
significant trade distortions. Fourth, rich countries use a wider range of taxes 
and,  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  collect  more  tax  revenues.  Fifth,  nontax 
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Finally, there is substantial quintile variance in net trade distortions by country 
with less for the countries in the richest and poorest quintiles of their data. 
Overall Comment 
This interesting piece  is made all the more so by  its strong conclusions. 
Previous work  in public finance and trade by these two authors has tended 
perhaps to be more analytically focused, but I interpret this paper’s primary 
contribution as helping explain the tariff  and border tax structures in poorer 
countries and relating these to domestic tax structures. I, therefore,  will say 
less about the analytical portion of the paper because my impression is that 
this is relatively straightforward. 
Assumed Determinants of  Protection 
I begin with the assumed rationale for protection in this paper, namely, that 
there is a well-defined  national welfare function and that revenue  needs  of 
government largely drive protection.  For people working in the trade policy 
area at the present time, this view of the world would, I think, be accepted not 
only as overly simplistic but as potentially misleading, even for smaller poorer 
countries. For instance, the reasons why we have the Multi Fiber Arrangement 
and  associated trade restrictions  in textiles and clothing are not  because of 
national  interest.  It is because  of concerns over adjustment costs, the  geo- 
graphic concentration of industry in protected countries, the high average age 
of  employees, the large fraction of females in the work force, and so on- 
namely,  the  particular  configuration  of  industry  protectionist  pressures. 
Equally, the reason why agriculture was left out of the GATT in the way that 
it was in  1947 reflected narrow sectional,  not national, interests. 
If  you look at the recent GATT publication  “Review of Developments in 
the  Trading  System,”  you  will  find  a  discussion  of  voluntary  export 
restraints currently in place. These number approximately one hundred thirty 
in  developed  and  developing  countries  at  the  present  time,  and  this  is 
excluding seventy-one measures in textiles outside the coverage of the Multi 
Fiber  Arrangement  and  another  fifty-odd restraint  measures  in  agriculture. 
Put simply, it is too simplistic to look at the structure of protection in both 
developed and developing countries and relate it to some notion of national 
interest  in  a  model  where  there  are revenue  needs  for protection.  While 
revenue needs from the tariff are undoubtedly there for some of the smaller 
countries, as a broad generalization over the whole of the trading system this 
is  both  inaccurate  and  simplistic.  And,  for  these  smaller  countries,  it  is 
usually  other  features  of  that  trade  regime  (import  licensing,  foreign 
exchange rationing,  etc.) that have the most influence on trade flows. 
The Role of  GATT 
I  found  the  paper’s  discussion  of  the  GATT  factually  somewhat 
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to  me  that  the  GATT  has  to  be  central  to  any  analysis  explaining  the 
phenomena that the authors have raised  in this paper. 
First  of  all,  it  is widely  agreed  in  the  trade  policy  community  that  the 
GATT’s  role  in  shaping  the  postwar  pattern  of  protection  both  between 
developed  countries  and  between  developed  and  developing  countries  has 
been  central,  particularly  through  MFN  under  Article  1  of  the  GATT. 
Through the seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that we have had 
in the GATT thus far, under MFN (most favored nation) small countries have 
been able to free ride on tariff negotiations between large countries because 
any  bilateral  negotiation  between  a  pair  of  large  countries  produces 
reductions  in  tariffs  that  are automatically  extended  to small countries.  In 
turn, because of the nature of the negotiation process conducted under MFN, 
large countries typically will  not negotiate with  small countries because,  if 
they  make  tariff  concessions,  these  are  automatically  extended  to  other 
countries. 
In  essence,  through  its  MFN  provisions  the  GATT  system  has  largely 
removed pressures on smaller and poorer countries to negotiate international 
agreements to apply discipline to protectionist interests abroad. As a result, 
forty years on we are left with small countries with high tariff rates and large 
countries  with  lower  tariff  rates.  This  pattern  applies  not  only  between 
developed  and  developing  countries  but  also  among  developed  countries. 
The mid-sized  countries  (Canada, Australia,  New  Zealand, and  the  larger 
European  Free  Trade  Association  countries)  generally  have  significantly 
higher tariffs  than  the  European  Community,  the  United  States, or Japan. 
They, in turn, have lower tariffs than even smaller developed countries such 
as Austria and Norway. 
In  turn,  the  GATT  also  provides  disciplines  that  link  border  taxes  and 
domestic taxes; these are unfortunately ignored in the paper. Article 3 of the 
GATT, which contains the principle of national treatment and covers indirect 
taxes,  was motivated by  the acknowledged need in  1947 that under GATT 
rules it should not be possible to reduce or eliminate tariffs but achieve the 
same protective effect through tax or other measures.  This, admittedly, is a 
much more narrowly applied article than the forms of offset that the authors 
have in mind, but there have been a number of panel cases involving Article 
3 measures.  These include early tax cases, and, more recently, these same 
issues  have  come  up  again  with  the  border  adjustment  issues  in  the 
value-added tax (VAT). 
Beyond Article 3, which constrains the use of domestic taxes in this way, 
there are other and wider provisions of the GATT that might be used should 
countries try to use offsets between these instruments as the authors suggest. 
The key ones are under Article 23: 1-B, which provides for nonnullification, 
violation,  and  impairment.  These provisions,  in  effect,  allow  contracting 
parties to withdraw concessions if  a binding on a tariff is offset by the use of 
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contracting parties have, in principle, already bound themselves to prevent 
changes in domestic policies that undo the effects of changes in tariffs. 
Therefore, some of the conjectures discussed in this paper, it seems to me, 
are  inappropriate  as  explanations  of  the  phenomena  they  pose.  The 
institutional structure of GATT partially limits what the authors suggest, and 
they also miss the major role that the structure of the GATT has played in 
generating a trading system with exactly those characteristics that they seek 
to explain in other ways. 
Tax and Tariff Interactions 
There  are  also  other  problems  with  the  interaction  between  tariffs  and 
taxes that the paper suggests. Developing countries have a wide variety of 
trade instruments in place and also an even larger variety of tax structures. 
Generally speaking, in the lower-income developing countries you will find 
trade policies that ban imports of consumption goods and have prioritization 
of  imports  through  foreign  exchange  licensing  schemes,  quantitative 
restrictions, and import licensing of various kinds as well as tariffs that are 
lower on imports of raw  materials and capital goods. On top of  that, there 
are frequently export bans on certain products and, depending on the product 
or country  one  is  talking  about, export-promotion  schemes  such as duty 
remissions. 
Tax structures are also complex but broadly have a pattern involving light 
or zero taxation on agriculture and heavy taxes on manufactures (especially 
through  traditional  excises and, increasingly,  a manufacturing  level  VAT). 
This picture, again, is an oversimplification, and there are many complicat- 
ing  features  of  tax  policy  of  which  it  is hard  to make  sense.  Generally 
speaking,  however,  these  patterns  of  trade  and  domestic  taxes  seem to 
compound one another, not offset one another, as the authors suggest. 
A related difficulty is the discussion of tariffs in the foreign trade regime 
in the paper. In many lower-income developing countries, tariffs coexist with 
other  extensive  external  sector  restrictions,  depending  on  the  geographic 
region one is talking about (quantitative restrictions are heavily in evidence 
in Africa, they are less heavily in evidence in Latin America, and they seem 
to be on the decline in the Asian Pacific). A combination of binding foreign 
exchange  rationing  and  quantitative  restrictions,  for instance,  means  that 
tariffs are not binding instruments in terms of trade distortions. Their role is 
frequently largely as lump-sum instruments that take rents away from holders 
of  quota  and  reallocate  revenues  to the  government.  Their  efficiency  as 
revenue-raising devices is partly because of  the nondistorting nature of  the 
tariff. 
Tariffs as a Revenue Source 
While the emphasis in the paper on the relative heavy reliance on tariffs 
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case  for  a  subset  of  developing  countries.  If  one  looks  at  the  new 
Government Finance Statistics yearbook published by the IMF, one will find 
that, for a number of smaller and lower-income developing countries,  taxes 
on  international  trade  and  transactions  account  for  a  large  portion  of 
revenues. 
Thus, using data for  1986, in the Gambia they  account for 68 percent of 
revenues,  in Uganda 69 percent,  and in Benin 53 percent.  However, as one 
goes  through  the  countries  by  size, even among  lower-income  countries, 
these numbers start falling.  Bangladesh is 32 percent and India 24 percent. 
By the time one gets to the NICs, one finds that Korea is around  14 percent 
of  revenues  accounted  for by  trade  taxes.  In  some of  the  Middle  Eastern 
countries,  the  numbers  can be  even  smaller,  for example,  14 percent  in 
Egypt. In the Latin American countries, the numbers also can become even 
smaller; Argentina is 13 percent, Brazil only 4 percent, and Jamaica (a much 
smaller country) only 4 percent.  So, while the paper seems right to focus on 
this crucial feature of trade taxes,  it is only really  so for a subset of other 
developing countries. 
It is also important to emphasize how quickly things are changing among 
developing  countries  since  there  is  now  substantial  trade  liberalization 
currently under way in these countries.  Mexico is a good example of this. 
When they joined the GATT in  1986, Mexico had bound their tariffs at 50 
percent;  the  average  tariff  in  Mexico  is  now  under  20  percent,  and,  as 
liberalization proceeds in the Uruguay Round, Mexico may  well bind even 
lower. In addition,  the revenue share of  trade taxes will fall. 
Determinants of  Domestic Tax Structure 
Like  trade  taxes,  the  basic  assumption  underlying  the  analytics  of  the 
paper, that administrative costs determine tax structure, is also a little bit too 
extreme. For  instance,  the  nontaxation  of  agriculture  in  many  developing 
countries that I have already referred to in part reflects political pressures on 
the urbadrural political balance.  Thus, rural  producers are ofter, subject to 
price controls on their products,  and rural  areas are also seen as the poorer 
segment of the economy. In the  absence of  a well-defined  transfer system, 
political balance is, in part, restored through  the tax structure. 
Many  other  elements  of  tax  structure  in  these  countries  cannot  be 
explained by administrative costs alone. India, for instance, still has taxes on 
transit through major cities, which has substantial effects on the shipment of 
products  across  the  country.  The  presence  of  these  taxes  reflects  the 
distribution  of  legislative  authority  between  the  national  government,  the 
states, and the municipalities and cities. 
Empirical Analysis 
It  is  always  too  easy  to  criticize  empirical  work,  and  I  am  only  too 
conscious  that  dealing with  this  number  of  countries  and trying  to extract 
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To  my taste,  however, the analysis involves an overly mechanical use of 
IMF data  without  sufficient  recognition  of  the  problems  involved.  Let me 
just illustrate a few instances. The definition of a tax in a developing country 
is  a very  difficult  matter  and is not adequately  resolved  in IMF data.  For 
instance, if you look at the work that Richard Bird and others have done on 
Colombia on parastatals, the count, I think, is around 160 different parastatal 
operations.  Many  of  these  are  revenue-raising  entities  for  government 
through  monopoly  purchase  and  marketing  operations  of  various  kinds. 
Despite  the  acknowledgments  made  in  the  paper,  including  or excluding 
these as part of the tax system makes a huge difference for countries such as 
this. 
In calculating tax rates, there are also many pitfalls.  For instance,  in the 
Indian case, the black economy  is one of the major topics of public policy 
discussion.  There  are  estimates  that  as  much  as  50  percent  of  income 
originating  in  the  urban  sector  may  be  contained  in  the  black  economy. 
There  are  rival  estimates  that  it  may  be  as  small  as 20  percent.  These 
features make a large difference to the effective tax rates used.  An element 
of  the  black  economy  is  also  the  misuse  of  export-promotion  schemes 
through various fungibility arrangements,  which are discussed in some of the 
Indian policy literature. 
The border distortions  are also a major problem, especially as these enter 
into the calculations of the authors in such a central way. As I understand the 
border  distortions  measure  that  the  authors  use,  they  do  not  include 
remission schemes,  which have been one of the central components  of the 
Korean export promotion drive in the years since 1962. They do not include 
foreign exchange allocation schemes, foreign  exchange retention  schemes, 
priority  credit  rationing,  and  other measures  that,  in  turn,  have  become 
significant  components  of  the  export-promotion  arrangements  in  many 
countries in Asia. 
Concluding Remarks 
In  conclusion,  despite  all  the  comments  above, I  would  commend  the 
authors for their attempt to focus on what is indeed a central and, to some, a 
puzzling  aspect  of  the  modem-day trading  system;  namely,  why  it is that 
smaller and poorer countries tend to have higher levels of protection? 
Having worked recently on these issues, however, I would also inject into 
the discussion of this paper that central to an understanding of trade policy in 
the  developing  world  are not  only  all the  issues  raised  above but  also an 
understanding of the intellectual climate of the developing world. The strong 
attachment to import substitution and the perceived need for high levels of 
protection for developmental  reasons to aid with industrialization have been 
central  in  the  postwar  years.  However,  my  impression  is  also  that  this 
intellectual  climate is now in more of  a state of flux than at any time in the 
postwar years. As I say above, there is a substantial unilateral liberalization 
under way, and developing countries are beginning to show more willingness 396  Roger H. Gordon/James Levinsohn 
to take  on disciplines  multilaterally  in  the  GATT,  in  part  because  of  their 
concerns to keep the trading system open. 
Indeed, if these developments accelerate, it may be in ten years’ time that 
we are discussing why smaller and poorer countries have modified their trade 
policies so quickly. In this event, we would perhaps not be fully convinced 
by  an  argument  that  what  caused  such  rapid  change  was  change  in 
administrative costs. 